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On the margins of the partisan political divide is a groundswell of anti-
corporate rhetoric conjuring images of an unbridled, unregulated, and uncon-
trollable corporate America. This Essay considers a casualty of this progres-
sive imagery: serious legislative and regulatory reforms to ensure corporate 
accountability. Demonizing all corporations does little to promote a progres-
sive reform agenda. More important, the absence of evidence-based policies 
and legislative reforms raises concerns, especially in light of the history of 
twentieth-century progressive thought and commitment to the role of science in 
law making. 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 37 
I. Ideology That Betrays .............................................................................. 41 
II.  The Costs of Demonizing the Largest Corporations ............................. 44 
III.  Legislation Destined to Fail ................................................................. 47 
Conclusion ................................................................................................... 50 
 
 
 † Julian Aresty Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Sociology and Criminol-
ogy at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Vic Khanna, Eric Orts, Bruce 
Freed, John Hasnas, Eduardo Saad Diniz, Mihailis Diamantis, Peter Conti-Brown, Susana Aires de Sou-
sa, and Samuel Mortimer for comments on earlier versions of this Essay.  
 †† Doctoral Program, Department of Legal Studies & Business Ethics at the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania. 
Wall Street and Progressivism 
37 
Introduction 
“Let’s be clear, the business model of Wall Street is fraud.”1 
 
In recent years, on the margins of our partisan political divide, there is a 
groundswell of anti-corporate rhetoric that questions the fundamental business 
model of Wall Street.2 This rhetoric calls for the restructuring of entire indus-
tries;3 for a wide range of strategies to combat the evils of corporate political 
influence;4 and for a resurgence of a “break them up” policy for financial firms 
and technology companies that are simply too big and successful.5 The image 
of an unbridled, unregulated, and uncontrollable Wall Street has become a fixa-
tion of the emerging progressive left.6 The time to tame the id of Wall Street is 
long overdue, we are told, and the tools of criminal law and corporate criminal 
justice are at our disposal. 
To be fair, this cathartic anti-corporate call for a new brand of progressive 
justice should be seen in context.7 We are living through a period of box-
checking regulation, where prescriptions for the reform of Wall Street are sold 
 
1. Bernie Sanders, Wells Fargo’s Business Model is Fraud, MEDIUM, (Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://medium.com/senator-bernie-sanders/wells-fargos-business-model-is-fraud-d19fb6fbe0a8 
[https://perma.cc/Q7EG-Q76D] (speaking about the fraud at Wells Fargo as an example of the more 
general and endemic problem on corporates). Senator Sanders’s statements also align well with those of 
Senator Elizabeth Warren. See The Editorial Board, Warren and Sanders, Policy Mates, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/warren-and-sanders-policy-mates-11571181041 
[https://perma.cc/V3WW-R3DY] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (comparing Sanders’s proclamation with 
Warren’s portrayal of Wall Street as “looting the economy”). 
2.  See generally EVAN OSBORNE, THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENT: 
CORPORATIONS AND THE PEOPLE WHO HATE THEM (2009).  
3.  See, e.g., Stop Wall Street Looting Act, H.R. 3848, 116th Cong. (2019) (restructur-
ing the private equity industry). 
4.  See, e.g., Protect Democracy from Criminal Corporations Act, H.R. 3004 § 2(a)(1), 
116th Cong. (2019) (prohibiting “criminal” corporations from making campaign contributions); Corpo-
rate Political Disclosure Act, H.R. 1053, 116th Cong. (2019) (amending “the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 to direct the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue regulations to require public corpora-
tions to disclose political expenditures”); see also Cydney Posner, Is it Time for Corporate Political 
Spending Disclosure?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION BLOG (Mar. 17, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/17/is-it-time-for-
corporate-political-spending-disclosure [https://perma.cc/773V-6MDV].  
5.  See, e.g., Tim Wu, Antitrust Returns to American Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/opinion/antitrust-2020-campaign.html?auth 
[https://perma.cc/E2SF-VJSE]; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust Proposals, THE 
REGULATORY REVIEW (Mar. 25, 2019) https://www.theregreview.org/2019/03/25/hovenkamp-warren-
campaigns-antitrust-proposals [https://perma.cc/7YNB-U8MA]. 
6.  For a discussion of the differences between and among ideological groups from the 
far left, center-left, progressive left, and religious left, see Yanchuan Sim et al., Measuring Ideological 
Proportions in Political Speeches, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN 
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 91 (2013); see also William S. Laufer, The Missing Account of Pro-
gressive Corporate Criminal Law, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 71, 116-28 (2017) (describing the promise of 
the progressive left). 
7.  See Staff of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Rigged Justice: 2016: How Weak Enforcement 
Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy (2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/ 
Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/45XL-82ZJ] (describing frustration with the absence of cor-
porate accountability). 
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to a vast army of compliance and regulatory professionals.8 New and old re-
frains spout such ideas as the killing of any and all regulation of the private sec-
tor is invariably good; or that the ever increasing criminalization of federal laws 
compromises autonomy and betrays the appropriate role of the state.9 We hear 
that businesses or businesspeople are inherently good or law-abiding,10 or vic-
tims of prejudice of the same degree as immigrants and people of color and so 
most deserving of our sympathies.11 The conventional academic wisdom is that 
successful self-regulation requires only the right mix of administrative incen-
tives, which would only be distorted by the blunt and unforgiving instrument of 
criminal law.12 Indeed, the most significant recent scholarship encourages the 
corporate criminal law to be less punitive and more of a “win for everyone”;13 
that we ought to pursue the rehabilitation of corporates14 and prevention of fu-
ture misconduct15 to the exclusion of any truly retributive measures. For some, 
even agreements not to prosecute corporations are still too “abusive.”16 As 
 
8.  For a discussion of the number and role of audit, legal, regulatory, and compliance 
professionals in large financial services firms, see generally William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regula-
tory Milestone, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 392, 394 (2017). 
9.  See, e.g., Tim Lynch, Over-Criminalization of Conduct/Over-Federalization of 
Criminal Law, CATO INSTITUTE (July 22, 2009), https://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-
testimony/overcriminalization-conductoverfederalization-criminal-law [https://perma.cc/6DTV-NRPD]; 
John-Michael Seibler & Jonathan M. Zalewski, Overcriminalization in the 115th Congress, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-
justice/report/overcriminalization-the-115th-congress [https://perma.cc/SSQ6-UH75].  
10.  See Steven Bittle & Jasmine Hébert, Controlling Corporate Crimes in Times of 
De-Regulation and Re-Regulation, in THE HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 484 (Melissa L. Rorie, 
ed., 2019) (identifying and problematizing the general belief that corporations are inherently good and 
law-abiding). 
11.  Bret Stephens, Bernie’s Wall Street Slander, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bernies-wall-street-slander-1454976868 [https://perma.cc/KTW5-7SVA] 
(last visited Nov 11, 2019) (Responding to Sanders’s quote (see epigraph), he deems the bankers of Wall 
Street “the most demonized people in America,” arguing that “[t]o insinuate that the people who make 
[Wall Street] work are swindlers is no less a slur than to tag immigrants as criminals and moochers” 
drawing a weak analogy between “Sanders’s economic prejudices” and “Donald Trump’s ethnic ones”). 
So-called “tragedy analogies” have long been a feature of bankers’ self-portrayal. In one case, a banker 
likened certain regulatory investigations to Eric Garner’s death at the hands of New York City Police-
men. In another, “Blackstone founder Stephen Schwarzman . . . compared US efforts to raise taxes on 
private equity to the Naz[i]” invasion of Poland. In a third case, Tom Perkins, founder of venture capital 
firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers, penned a public letter “that compared criticism of the wealthy 
to Nazi persecution of the Jews.” See Brooke Masters, Bankers Will Fail to Win Back Trust with Trage-
dy Analogies, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/3ceb1fa6-8128-11e4-b956-
00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/VG7X-9JJH] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). In the academic world, there 
is still a sense that business is in need of defenders. See infra note 57. 
12.  See, e.g., Douglas Husak, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 4-11 (2007); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Crimi-
nal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009). 
13.  Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corpo-
rate Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 565 (2018). 
14.  Id.; Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabili-
tation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2009). 
15.  W. Robert Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 
905, 914 (2019). 
16.  Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecu-
tion Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1436-37 (2007) (bemoaning the fact that, when (supposedly) 
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scholars question the idea that criminal punishment should be at all punitive,17 
the goals of economic efficiency and more perfect markets reign alongside phi-
losophies of unrestrained capitalism.18 
The anti-corporate reactions to these unfortunate realities do not fall into 
distinct camps, but rather exist on a continuum. In the extreme, it is said we 
should abolish the corporation or “corporate capitalism” because it is irredeem-
ably evil; because its criminality is “inherent,”19 part of its “essence”20, in its 
“DNA,”21 or is its “nature.”22 In slightly more palpable formulations, an origi-
nal sin of criminality is projected on specific markets, sectors, or industries, 
like Wall Street23 or Big Pharma.24 These critiques, though, are betrayed by 
their generality25 and lead to one of two conclusions. Either critics assume the 
 
“[u]nable to risk a potential indictment, the corporation is thus left at the mercy of the prosecutor” and 
identifying “[t]he abusive tendencies of this bargaining imbalance”). 
17.  See Matthew Caulfield & William S. Laufer, The Promise of Corporate Charac-
ter Theory, 103 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 101, 106–07 (2018) (arguing one rehabilitative approach is “really 
no more than a clever regulatory or administrative proposal” and risks being a “mere variant of deter-
rence theory” with a justification of the “orthodox consequentialist variety”); John Hasnas, Clockwork 
Corporations: A Valiant Effort to Do the Impossible, 103 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 28, 29 (2018) (arguing 
one rehabilitative approach “is not a theory of punishment, but a theory of regulation masquerading as a 
theory of punishment” because “[p]reventing crime is what one does in advance of criminal activity. 
That is what we use regulation for. Punishing crime necessarily comes after criminal activity and is a 
response to it.”). 
18.  Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Manage-
ment Practices, 4 ACADEMY OF MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75 (2005); Sandra Waddock, Foundational 
Memes for a New Narrative About the Role of Business in Society, 1 HUMANISTIC MGMT. J. 91, 97 
(2016) (arguing that “the currently dominant neoliberal narrative can be stated as: Businesses and econ-
omies operate best with free markets, free economies, and free trade on a global scale, that is, with as 
few rules and restrictions as possible”). 
19.  See generally Alexander Glebovskiy, Inherent Criminogenesis in Business Or-
ganisations, 26 J. FIN. CRIME 432 (2019). 
20.  STEVE TOMBS & DAVID WHYTE, THE CORPORATE CRIMINAL: WHY 
CORPORATIONS MUST BE ABOLISHED 157-58, 173, 180 (2015) (arguing that the corporation “is an es-
sentially destructive, irresponsible phenomenon,” that it is “inherently, essentially destructive” and that 
“in essence the corporation is rapacious, violent,…and systematically criminal.”) (all emphasis original). 
This is despite their corollary thesis that “historically, empirically and theoretically, … neither corpora-
tions per se, nor corporate activities in particular, exist in any natural nor inevitable form” Id. at 157. 
21.   Id. at iv (stating that “criminality is part of the DNA of the modern corporation”). 
22.  HARRY GLASBEEK, CAPITALISM: A CRIME STORY 6 (2018) (“[C]orporate capital-
ism, in legal terms, is criminal in nature.”). 
23.  See, e.g., FRANÇOIS MORIN, A WORLD WITHOUT WALL STREET? (2013); Sand-
ers, supra note 1. 
24.  PETER C. GØTZSCHE, DEADLY MEDICINES AND ORGANISED CRIME: HOW BIG 
PHARMA HAS CORRUPTED HEALTHCARE (2013) (arguing that the business model of Big Pharma is liter-
ally organized crime). 
25.  See, e.g., Justin B. Biddle, Review: Peter Gøtzsche, Deadly Medicines and Organ-
ised Crime: How Big Pharma Has Corrupted Healthcare, 26 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 40 (2016) (argu-
ing it is a significant problem for any analysis to treat “‘big pharma’ as an organized monolith. ‘Big 
pharma’ is not an organized entity but rather a collection of corporations, and as such, ‘big pharma’ 
could not be considered an organized criminal enterprise. Individual pharmaceutical companies could 
perhaps be organized criminal operations; ‘big pharma’ cannot.”); Matthew C. Klein, “The Business 
Model of Wall Street is Fraud”? Kind of., FIN. TIMES, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/02/11/2152613/ 
the-business-model-of-wall-street-is-fraud-kind-of [https://perma.cc/R9M5-2BU2] (last visited Nov. 11, 
2019) (pointing out, in response to Sanders’s critique (see epigraph), that “widespread criminality across 
a range of business lines . . . isn’t the same as actually having fraud as the core of the business,” and that 
“the financial sector contains many parts, often with competing economic and policy interests, so it 
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extreme position that certain classes of corporations are criminal and thus a 
cancer we must excise whatever the consequences, or they have a dilettantish 
orientation toward critique and progress, preferring merely rhetorical criticisms 
to genuine reforms.26 
For those somewhere in the middle of the business demonization and dei-
fication divide, it is difficult to ignore the image, on one hand, of Antifa re-
cruits taking to the streets, signs in hand, to fend off every last contaminated bit 
of our capitalistic system by breaking a Starbucks window front. On the other 
hand, it is likewise difficult to erase the image of an old bloated Wall Street ty-
coon taking a twilight cruise around New York Harbor aboard one of his 125-
foot Westport yachts. Once we get some perspective on this demonization and 
deification imagery, though, it becomes clear that there are real casualties from 
the incessant pull to the far left or far right. This Essay considers one such cas-
ualty from the far left: serious legislative and regulatory reforms that ensure 
corporate accountability for criminal wrongdoing.27 
After exploring why mere caricatures of corporate America so significant-
ly betray the heritage of progressive ideology in Part I, it is argued in Part II 
that this demonic imagery of corporates takes a serious toll: gratuitous political 
rhetoric often substitutes for serious law reforms or legislation with a chance of 
passage in Congress. Evidence of this toll is seen in a cursory review of some 
proposed legislation in Part III. The Essay concludes that the costs of demon-
ization is paid at a time when our embrace of the potential good that comes 
from a well-governed, responsible, and sustainable private sector is more than 
necessary for the success of meaningful collective action strategies, progres-
sive, libertarian, or otherwise. 
Corporate accountability should be the darling of the progressive move-
ment. Instead, by extending the indignation that is justifiably leveled against 
serious and chronic corporate wrongdoers toward all business, advocacy for 
accountability dissolves by way of an inherent tension.28 Most everywhere the 
 
doesn’t make much sense to talk about ‘Wall Street’ as a unified entity”); Thomas Donaldson, Three 
Ethical Roots of the Economic Crisis, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 5, 5-6 (2012) (addressing those who “slam the 
‘greed is good’ mentality of Wall Street,” arguing that “no serious study has shown that greed is higher 
on Wall Street than in other industries, or for that matter higher in any one industry than in another”); 
Gwendolyn Gordon and David Zaring note the plentiful anti-banker sentiment in the United States and 
its “variety of methods, ranging from harangues to controlled experiments.” Ethical Bankers, 42 J. 
CORP. L. 559, 566–68 (2016). 
26.  See Tibor R. Machan, Business Ethics in a New Key, 21 J. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
1, 9 (2006) (distinguishing between reasonable critique and heedless “business-bashing”). 
27.  There may be greater costs to the deification of Wall Street, but arguments con-
sistent with extreme libertarian ideologies are much more familiar and already taken. See, e.g., Laufer, 
supra note 6, at 116-28. 
28.  David Whyte, “Death to the Corporation”: A Modest Proposal, in THE WORLD 
TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: SOCIALIST REGISTER 2019, at 289 (Leo Panitch & Greg Albo, eds., 2018) 
(“Therein lies a core contradiction: when regulation (and punishment) is effective, it has the effect of 
stabilizing the system. When regulation is most effective, it enhances the longevity of capitalism as a 
system. Yet as socialists, we know that this is not in the interests of everyone. When we demand effec-
tive regulation, and when we demand justice for a criminal ruling class in such moments, we are also 
demanding that capitalism corrects itself. This is why demanding punishment of corporations, or of their 
executives, as a panacea to such crises or to the problems caused by capitalism can only ever be a strate-
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far left sees a corporate, or a corporate of a certain kind, it sees a target of in-
dignation. In projecting an intrinsic evil onto capitalistic endeavors, some can-
not imagine or simply do not care that corporations could be good29—that they 
could be accountable with vigilant oversight and reasonable regulation. 
I. Ideology That Betrays 
Buried in the scholarly literature on corporate criminal liability and corpo-
rate regulation are serious efforts to conceive of the requisite moral agency to 
bind an entity criminally; to identify the criteria prosecutors should rely on in 
considering charges against individual wrongdoers and/or blameworthy enti-
ties; to fashion liability rules and standards of culpability that connect entity 
wrongdoing with the substantive law; and to conceive of corporate punishments 
that recognize the potential for collateral consequences but ensure fair and just 
direct consequences.30 
This body of normative and doctrinal scholarship on corporate accounta-
bility continues to evolve slowly, hampered by very limited decisional law on 
point, a long history of failed substantive law reform, and eviscerated or 
“amended away” legislation passed following notable scandals.31 It is, however, 
a body of work that both the left and right could draw from in conceiving and 
proposing corporate criminal justice policies. And yet, there is scant resort to 
the marketplace of ideas and theories on both sides of the political stump.32 The 
 
gy of limited or modest reform.”); Rafael Alcadipani & Cíntia Rodrigues de Oliveira Medeiros, When 
Corporations Cause Harm: A Critical View of Corporate Social Irresponsibility and Corporate Crimes, 
J. BUS. ETHICS (OnlineFirst 2019), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10551-019-
04157-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UR6-99KF] (arguing that “corporate crime could be perceived as pro-
ducing research that does not challenge the essence of contemporary corporation profit-seeking activities 
that ultimately produces corporate harm” and that “corporate crime [is an] ideolog[y] that assist[s] in 
disguising the contradiction between producing shareholder value and the social good that is at the heart 
of the modern corporation system and the current economic system”). 
29.  Jason Brennan argues that we have an unnecessarily narrow, political conception 
of civic virtue. The civic value of for-profit business ought not be overlooked. See generally Jason 
Brennan, For-Profit Business as Civic Virtue, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 313 (2012). 
30.  See, e.g., THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS (Eric W. Orts & N. Craig Smith, 
eds., 2017); Mihailis E. Diamantis & William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution and Punishment, 15 
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 453, 454 (2019) (describing the “funnel” of corporate criminal justice). This lit-
erature reflects many lifetimes of scholarship, from Braithwaite, Coffee, and Fisse to Aires de Sousa, 
Alexander, Arlen, Baer, Buell, Cohen, Diamantis, Garrett, Grabosky, Haugh, Khanna, Langevoort, Mil-
ler, Nelson, Parker, Saad-Diniz, Sepinwall, Simpson, Soltes, Thomas, and many others. 
31.  This marketplace is challenging because some of the best scholarship and most 
imaginative thinking about corporate crime by pioneers of this field are pushed to the margins, replaced 
by more contemporary or current work. For an example of such work, see generally MARSHALL B. 
CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980); BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW 
ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).   
32.  There is also little attention paid to how extralegal initiatives at private ordering 
may achieve the progressive ends sought by legislation. Compare the demonstrated success of the CPA-
Zicklin Index for Corporate Accountability, CTR. FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY, 
https://politicalaccountability.net/index (last visited Oct. 27, 2019), in creating transparency in corporate 
political contributions with the aims of the Transparency in Corporate Political Spending Act, H.R. 
1176, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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same may be said of a rich literature on the slow march toward co-regulatory 
and plural regulatory systems, where regulators and the regulated will soon be 
connecting.33  Finally, corporate accountability for the largest of multinationals 
requires global policies and effective international regulatory regimes. The im-
mense challenges of accountability for the most powerful multinationals in our 
interdependent global economy remain largely unmet. 
It seems as if pushing to the hard left or hard right encourages some who 
are politically inclined to disregard the policy outcomes of proposed legislation, 
while ignoring the analytic rigors of theory and, even worse, the power and 
constraints of empiricism. At a time when other advanced democratic countries 
are seeking and exploring evidence-based policy making, we must find what 
comfort we can in hearing the musings and intuitions of presidential candidates, 
grounded in their personal reflections on American progressivism or, from 
those on the right, ideas sourced from a strong though vague sense of American 
exceptionalism.34 Politicians supporting the battle against the most affluent or 
those catering to the excesses of tycoons are not pushing for rigorous evalua-
tion research and sophisticated field experimentation to determine which anti-
corruption strategy works; which corporate crime deterrence policy is most ef-
fective; or which approach to corporate compliance actually reduces the likeli-
hood of employee malfeasance. These are not the disconnected hypotheses of 
out-of-touch academics.  With an estimated 15% to 20% of the operating costs 
of financial institutions going to governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) ex-
penditures, we should know—actually know—if the regulatory costs assumed 
by the private sector are at all connected to better or more effective governance 
and regulation.35 
Indeed, there are real costs to following archetypal imagery of pro- and 
anti-business to their logical ends. Most significant, buying this kind of iconic 
imagery may discourage investment in the kind of research that produces evi-
dence that is as definitive as social science now permits.36 Consider, as exam-
ple, the impact of the Campbell Collaboration review of corporate crime deter-
rence policies. Criminologists scour available data for any evidence of 
corporate crime deterrence in existing criminal justice policies. Meta reviews of 
the best research available, however, reveal scarce systematic evidence, like 
 
33.  For an excellent discussion of different and emerging governance approaches see 
generally BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, FOSTERING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH SELF-AND CO-
REGULATION (2012); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 691 (2003); Peter N. Grabosky, 
Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE 527 (1995). 
34. See, e.g., PAUL CAIRNEY, THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING 
(2016) (exploring the challenges of relying on evidence-based programs and policies). 
35.  MATTHIAS MEMMINGER, MIKE BAXTER, & EDMUND LIN, BAIN & CO., BANKING 
REGTECH TO THE RESCUE? 1 (2016) (“We estimate that governance, risk and compliance (GRC) costs 
account for 15% to 20% of the total ‘run the bank’ cost base of most major banks. And GRC demand 
drives roughly 40% of costs for ‘change the bank’ projects under way.”). 
36.  Christine Parker & Vibeke Nielsen, The Challenge of Empirical Research on 
Business Compliance and Regulatory Capitalism, 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 45 (2009) (an outstanding 
review of the promise of empirical approaches to compliance). 
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that which would be provided by well-designed field experimentation with ran-
domized controlled trials.37 Simply translated: no one is offering evidence that 
the kinds of regulatory and criminal justice policies that we invest in actually 
have any deterrent effect.38 This represents a colossal opportunity cost: the ad-
vocacy for evidence-free policies displaces advocacy for the kind of evidence-
based initiatives that are known to work, i.e., initiatives that are supported by 
experimental evidence.39 
There are many reasons why we should care that there is little to no evi-
dence supporting huge investments in GRC systems and programs. Starting 
with the most obvious, the regulatory burden on the private sector should be 
inextricably tied to one or more objectives of corporate crime control. Compli-
ance expenditures, standing alone, should not be a preemptive tax or preemp-
tive penalty for estimated and projected wrongdoing.40 There is, though, a more 
subtle and persuasive reason for caution. 
The brand of progressivism associated with some far left-leaning politics 
today betrays its ideological heritage. This heritage never conceived of markets 
as ugly forms of corporatism. Progressive dogma supports law reforms—no 
matter how significant—that are driven by evidence. Progressive predecessors 
in the early twentieth century were off the rails with certain despicable social 
policies,41 but, to their credit, embraced at least in general terms the central role 
of science and proportional social controls as foundational principles in com-
batting wrongdoing, regulatory largess, and capture.42 This heritage finds its 
roots in a century-long appreciation by social scientists that we needed newer, 
more imaginative frameworks—economic, sociological, and legal—to control 
the expanding powers and growing reach of corporations.43 Progressivism’s 
 
37.  See Sally S. Simpson et al., Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic Review, 
CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (2014) (capturing all experimental research conducted to date); Na-
talie Schell-Busey et al., What Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence, 15 CRIM. 
& PUB. POL’Y 387 (2016) (revealing just how little is known about what works in deterring corporations 
from wrongdoing). 
38.  Ray Paternoster, Deterring Corporate Crime: Evidence and Outlook, 15 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 383 (2016) (commenting on the very limited evidence found in the corpo-
rate deterrence protocol of the Campbell Collaboration). 
39. See David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate Compli-
ance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 
317 (2016) (discussing the challenges of evidence-based research); Eugene Soltes, Evaluating the Effec-
tiveness of Corporate Compliance Programs: Establishing a Model for Prosecutors, Courts, and Firms, 
14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 965 (2018); Danielle E. Warren, Joseph P. Gaspar, & William S. Laufer, Is For-
mal Ethics Training Merely Cosmetic? A Study of Ethics Training and Ethical Organizational Culture, 
24 BUS. ETHICS Q. 85, 106-08 (2014) (exploring which factors in an integrity initiative at large bank 
contribute to changes in both behavior and culture).   
40.  See Laufer, supra note 8, at 398. 
41.  There was a very serious dark side to the old progressivism (e.g., promoting eu-
genics). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Progressives: Racism and Public Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV 
947 (2017). 
42.  A fuller account of progressive policymaking heritage can be found in Laufer, 
supra note 6, at 98-106. 
43.  Recent notable works include: BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON 
LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (2001); Malcolm 
Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 173, 174 (2001); 
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long embrace of the “transformative scientific state”44 as both a tool and object 
of reform45 reflects a recognition of the power and limitations of the state: its 
power to effect change in society, alongside its tendency to be slow to adopt 
modern tools of regulation and intervention. The centrality of science to the 
progressive agenda was not an accident. Progressives’ belief in legislative and 
regulatory intervention by government relied on their faith in the capacities of 
government officials who were suitably committed to marshal “economics, the 
social sciences, ethics, or other objective criteria to help define the best poli-
cy.”46 
Modern progressives certainly recognize the power of the state—but often 
fail to see how that power is compromised without a recognition of the import 
of scientific evidence or theory in guiding it. The collective indifference to em-
pirical validation of corporate criminal measures predictably leads to misguided 
and weak reforms that legacy progressives earnestly sought to avoid. In their 
wake, champions of modern progressivism should be competing fiercely for the 
best evidence in support of the most thoroughly tested, evaluated, and effective 
corporate criminal justice policies and programs. Progressivism’s ideological 
roots are allergic to rhetoric that does no more than stir and then capitalize on 
anti-corporate passions. Labeling the business model of Wall Street fraud, and 
ostracizing those who refuse to taunt or jeer, can only distract from the century-
long progressive goal of wrestling corporations into compliance with the law 
and good, socially beneficial governance.47 
II.  The Costs of Demonizing the Largest Corporations 
Ensuring any semblance of corporate accountability is already difficult 
enough. Employee survey data reveal a steady and robust rate of ethical infrac-
tions and actionable criminal wrongdoing in corporations, nearly all of which 
ultimately falls outside of the formalities of the criminal justice system.48 In 
place of the resort to the most formal of social controls, though, the vast majori-
ty of corporate criminal wrongdoing is not formally investigated in ways that 
are reviewable; few internal investigations result in an actionable criminal in-
 
Malcolm Rutherford, Science and Social Control: The Institutionalist Movement in American Econom-
ics, 1918-1947, 3 ERASMUS J. PHIL. & ECON. 47 (2010); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2005); Thomas C. 
Leonard, Progressive Era Origins of the Regulatory State and the Economist as Expert, 47 HIST. POL. 
ECON. 49 (2015). 
44.  Leonard, supra note 43, at 55. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Herbert Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought, 81 
IOWA L. REV 149, 149 (1995). 
47.  Centrists should not have exclusive claim to evidence-based legislation. See Bo 
Winegard, Centrism: A Moderate Manifesto, QUILLETTE (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://quillette.com/2017/08/29/centrism-moderate-manifesto [https://perma.cc/D6EN-49XB] (arguing 
that “[p]olitical ideologies tend to blind people to the best policies. One should not seek a ‘conservative’ 
answer to poverty or a ‘liberal’ answer . . . . One should seek the best answer.”) (emphasis in original).  
48.  See Laufer, supra note 8, at 420. 
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vestigation; fewer cases are formally adjudicated, and only the tiniest of frac-
tions go to trial or are offered one of the much heralded non-prosecution 
agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, or corporate integrity agree-
ments.49 Firm size and systemic importance to the global economy remain gen-
erally good predictors of prosecutorial zealousness or deference. 
Demonizing the largest corporations on Wall Street for their deviance 
does little to further corporate criminal justice. It does nothing to strengthen 
corporate self-regulation; nothing to enhance the reporting channels for corpo-
rate whistleblowers and qui tam relators; and nothing to encourage prosecutors 
to bring large financial institutions to justice along with those who lead them. 
Demonization does nothing to diminish the opacity of corporate self-regulation; 
disturb the multi-stakeholder compliance game; and diminish the “dark figure” 
of corporate crime.50 
Instead, demonizing the most powerful actors on Wall Street contributes 
to the naive intuition that firms are all criminal, and that capitalism is innately 
criminogenic. Labeling all or some vague subset of firms as criminals is func-
tionally similar to labeling none as criminals. Some of the critics in question 
recognize this and therefore reject the concept of “corporate crime” as a corpo-
rate-friendly ideology, since such a concept would purport to distinguish be-
tween criminal corporations and non-criminal corporations; such a distinction 
is untenable as all corporate activity, they say, is fundamentally at odds with 
social value.51 
When we are told that the “[t]he business model of Wall Street is fraud,” 
we are not asked to reflectively consider what would make it better. Instead of 
encouraging progressive reform, these overtures present us with a choice be-
tween tolerating rampant wrongdoing and eliminating Wall Street altogether. 
This is a choice in name only. We are then most plausibly inclined to tolerate 
crime and embrace an ideology that exacerbates it by way of rationalization;52 
“business is business,” a classic example of criminogenic rationalization,53 be-
comes “business is crime and we are businesspeople.”54 
 
49.  See Diamantis & Laufer, supra note 30, at 458-60. 
50.  The dark figure of corporate crime is the difference between wrongdoing known 
to or experienced by employees and reports of wrongdoing known to authorities.  
51.  Alcadipani & Rodrigues, supra note 28, at 9 (arguing that “corporate crime [is an] 
ideolog[y] that assist[s] in disguising the contradiction between producing shareholder value and the 
social good that is at the heart of the modern corporation system and the current economic system”). 
52.  See generally Todd Haugh, Sox on Fish: A New Harm of Overcriminalization, 
109 NW. U. L. REV. 835 (2014) (arguing that overcriminalization, especially in the case of white-collar 
offenders, is itself criminogenic insofar as it normalizes crime by way of providing ex ante rationaliza-
tions for would-be criminals). 
53.  Id. at 840; Donald R. Cressey, The Respectable Criminal, 3 CRIMINOLOGICA 13, 
15 (1965). 
54.  In their classic treatment of “techniques of neutralization,” David Matza and 
Gresham Sykes argue that “social controls that serve to check or inhibit deviant motivational patterns 
are rendered inoperative [when] the individual is freed to engage in delinquency without serious to dam-
age to self-image”; when successful, “the delinquent both has his cake and eats it too, for he remains 
committed to the dominant normative system and yet so qualifies its imperative that violation are ‘ac-
ceptable’ if not ‘right.’” Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 664, 
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Sometimes provocative coaxing is, rightly or wrongly, used strategically. 
Politicians may feel they need to inflate or radicalize their claims in order to 
amplify them—to reach their followers’ and other legislators’ minds and hearts 
with passion and sweeping rhetoric rather than reason. One might suspect that 
many do not really believe what they are saying—that they, instead, have an 
eminently reasonable outlook on mitigating corporate crime. In the interest of 
effective social progress, they may be true progressives in practice and fiery 
radicals in oratory only. But if this were the case, we would see it reflected in 
enlightened, empirically informed legislation aimed at mitigating corporate 
crime. We would also witness some instrumental, political advantage to this 
fiery rhetoric. Instead, as we will argue in the next Section, we find legislation 
with similarly fiery appellations but largely hollow implications. 
None of this is to excuse or diminish the serious costs of the deification of 
Wall Street and, more generally, corporations. Deification is transparently self-
serving, often at the expense of general social welfare. The “good” that corpo-
rations are responsible for is already distorted by some companies’ instrumental 
use of exaggerated imagery claiming leadership in good governance, compli-
ance with law, social responsibility and social impact.55 The long and storied 
history of corporate greenwashing and United Nations “bluewashing” need not 
be repeated.56 In passionately but vaguely bemoaning corporate wrongdoing, 
those who claim the progressive banner undermine their own standing to con-
tradict those who otherwise claim that “business” needs its own cadres of de-
fenders.57 
 
667 (1957). Identifying crime with business can have one of at least two effects; either it will tend steer 
the current social stigmas against crime towards reducing (specific kinds of) business activity writ-large, 
or it will tend to reduce stigma against crime by identifying it with the evidently acceptable practice that 
is business. In our view, the latter is much more likely; by calling business, a largely morally permissible 
(and mutually beneficial) activity, criminal, we are encouraged to think of crime as a seeming necessity 
of business and therefore as similarly acceptable. Criminals and would-be criminals will then have their 
cake and eat even more of it, since the dominant normative system will have further inoculated crime as 
just part of doing business. This is consistent with the ‘everyone else is doing it’ mode of criminogenic 
rationalization. See Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective, 
83 J. BUS. ETHICS 595, 603 (2008) (arguing that “there mere fact that others are breaking the law [can 
be] used to suggest that it is unreasonable for society to expect compliance. An appeal to the fact of 
widespread violation may also be used to remove the moral stigma associated with an offense. In either 
case, the goal is to show that the law is out of touch with social expectations, and therefore that en-
forcement is illegitimate”). These rationalization logics, however misguided, may be built on otherwise 
reasonable moral intuitions. See generally Joseph Heath, “But Everyone Else Is Doing It”: Competition 
and Business Self-Regulation, 49 J. SOCIAL PHIL. 516 (2018) (presenting several plausible normative 
principles underlying the ‘everyone else is doing it’ excuse or justification). 
55.  See generally ANAND GIRIDHARADAS, WINNERS TAKE ALL: THE ELITE 
CHARADE OF CHANGING THE WORLD (2018). 
56.  See William S. Laufer, Social Accounting and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 253, 255 (2003) (corporations that instrumentally claim allegiance to UN principles when 
their practices are non-conforming are said to be “bluewashing”). 
57.  See generally TYLER COWEN, BIG BUSINESS: A LOVE LETTER TO AN AMERICAN 
ANTI-HERO (2019); see also TIBOR R. MACHAN & JAMES E. CHESHER, A PRIMER ON BUSINESS ETHICS 
37 (2002); Gregory Wolcott, The New (Old) Case for the Ethics of Business, 132 J. BUS. ETHICS 127, 
127 (2015) (proclaiming that “[b]usiness needs defenders” given that business “students are told, in me-
dia, culture, and even some of their classrooms, that their careers are morally suspect”); Machan, supra 
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Ultimately, demonizing business sows an extraordinary distrust of all 
things corporate, and at a particularly unfortunate time. Unfortunate because 
there is a notable convergence in compliance methods, technologies, standards, 
and research that requires a true and trusted partnership between the regulated 
and regulators. Deifying and demonizing the private sector do little to support 
ways that firms might seize upon this convergence; little to encourage the de-
velopment of co-regulatory models; and little to decrease their regulatory spend 
through the inevitable transition to evidence-based GRC systems. 
III.  Legislation Destined to Fail 
It is sad but true that current progressive rhetoric, though motivated by so-
cial welfare and corporate accountability, fails to be true to its own motivating 
goals. We should have confidence that those with the strongest voices against 
corporate fraud and for progressive solutions propose legislation that fairly and 
justly hold corporations accountable. Sadly, there is no impressive pipeline of 
new, innovative, evidence-based legislation pending before Congress that em-
braces the promise of effective corporate regulation. 
The legislation associated with leading progressive voices are routinely 
drafted with slim hopes of passage. Even the best is a mixed bag of old pro-
gressive reforms and extant state law remedies. The Accountable Capitalism 
Act (ACA), for example, expands corporate obligations to stakeholders beyond 
shareholders in ways comparable to “constituency statutes,”58 and proposes 
federal chartering for corporations of a certain size.59 Both ideas are notable 
and characteristically progressive, but most states have already adopted constit-
uency statutes, a majority of states offer benefit corporation status, and even the 
conservative Business Roundtable now at least formally recognizes a progres-
sive variant of stakeholder capitalism.60 The value of enacting a federal law is 
unclear given our history of corporate law reforms and existing state law. 
Notably, a wide range of federal corporate chartering laws were proposed 
over the past century,61 all unsuccessful.62 The Act’s proposed charter revoca-
 
note 26, at 4 (lamenting that “business itself, as a profession, is something that is mostly distrusted and 
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59.  The Act requires corporations with more than $1 billion in revenue to obtain a 
federal charter as a United States Corporation. See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, § 2(A)(iii), 
115th Cong. (2018).  
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Economy That Serves All Americans,” BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-
promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/VS3S-6Y8Y]. 
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tion provisions for corporations that engage in repeated and egregious illegal 
conduct seem powerfully progressive, but state attorneys general already have 
charter revocation powers under state law. And states routinely revoke charters, 
most often for failure to pay business taxes or for a persistent course of fraudu-
lent acts. More important, the Act invites cases that are “too big” to indict and 
prosecute, especially with the looming prospects of corporate capital punish-
ment for United States corporations.63 
Other early stage efforts at progressive legislation are said to undermine 
the value proposition of an entire industry. For example, the Stop Wall Street 
Looting Act of 2019 takes direct aim with a near death blow at the generally 
unregulated private equity market by allowing for joint and several liability for 
controlling private funds, and making it void against public policy to indemnify 
a private fund.64 No matter how consistent with a broad progressive vision of 
“economic patriotism,” opponents will inevitably line up against this Act, cast-
ing it as the destruction of an industry, and making it impossible to pass both 
houses of Congress. 
More often, proposed legislation appears consistent with powerful politi-
cal slogans (e.g., “too powerful to prosecute” and “too-big-to-jail”65) but is lit-
tle more than fluff, substantively. Consider the likely fate of the Corporate Ex-
ecutive Accountability Act of 2019,66 which resurrects the Responsible 
Corporate Officer Doctrine in proposing that corporate executives be held crim-
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can lawmakers justify a simple threshold revenue minimum? Are firms with annual revenue below this 
threshold not deserving of revocation? These are but a few obvious questions raised by the Act. Less 
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culpability, liability, and sanctions. The heavy pendulum moved from courts in the aftermath of the 
United States Sentencing Commission’s Chapter Eight Guidelines to prosecutors with different itera-
tions of the Federal Principles of Business Prosecution. With this Act, where will discretion vest? 
63.  This is the case even with the one-year grace period for appeals. There are some 
reasonably progressive parts of the Act, no matter how likely their passage, including employee partici-
pation in director selection for corporations that exceed $1 billion in annual revenue, a practice followed 
in a number of developed countries; and requiring shareholder and board approval for corporate political 
expenditures. 
64.  Stop Wall Street Looting Act, H.R. 3848, 116th Cong. (2019) (requiring the “Se-
curities and Exchange Commission to issue rules requiring private funds to publicly disclose certain 
information”). 
65.  See generally, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS 
COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014). 
66.  Corporate Executive Accountability Act, S. 1010, 116th Cong. (establishing 
“criminal liability for negligent executive officers of major corporations”). 
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inally liable for negligently permitting or failing to prevent a crime.67 First of-
fenders are fined and/or subject to incarceration for up to one year. This Act 
imposes a form of strict liability on agents in ways comparable to the strict at-
tribution of fault to a corporate entity with vicarious liability. Curiously, it is 
the strictness of vicarious fault and its harsh collateral consequences that so 
limit its embrace by prosecutors and courts.68 It seems to make little sense to 
impose the same strictness and consequences on corporate agents—even those 
whose position places them in responsible roles. 
More important, this Act is proffered as a way to right the wrongs of cor-
porate offending. Finding negligent corporate officers does little to respond to 
an organizational offense. It would be infinitely better for Congress to explore 
legislation that captures one or more constructs of genuine corporate fault, e.g., 
organizational culture, constructive fault, decision making, or character.69 Leg-
islation is desperately needed to close the conceptual gap between century-old 
conceptions of vicarious liability and fault that may be reasonably attributed to 
an entity. And, more practically, this Act applies to corporations already con-
victed or in negotiated settlements. Thus, it reaches the smallest fraction of cas-
es, so small that it defies reason to think that this brings corporations to justice. 
At the centerpiece of the Ending Too Big to Jail Act70 is a requirement 
that a senior officer sign a due diligence certification that there was no criminal 
conduct or civil fraud on their watch.71 How does this certification achieve the 
objective of ending too big to jail? Remarkably, lawmakers seem to assume 
that this provision will deter a good deal of fraudulent representations. But 
when the inevitable happens and fraud occurs, what does that Act offer? There 
still is a too-big problem. 
The balance of the Act proposes an extension of the Special Inspector 
General for the Troubled Assets Relief Program as an “enforcement agency 
dedicated solely to investigating fraud committed by financial institutions and 
insiders at financial institutions . . . .”72 The notion that the too big problem 
would be addressed by centralizing prosecutorial capacity is, at best, an inter-
esting hypothesis. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice already 
calls the final shots with respect to the decision making surrounding Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act prosecutions and other discretionary prosecutorial deter-
minations. A competing and, arguably, more attractive hypothesis is that there 
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are some concerns in building silos of functionary capacity in ways that may be 
vulnerable to political whim i.e., decentralizing prosecutorial capacity mini-
mizes the prospects of overreach and capture. Moreover, as was demonstrated 
in the federal corruption prosecution of the European electronics conglomerate 
Siemens some years ago, not all too-big challenges to prosecution come from 
cases brought against financial institutions.73 
The too big to investigate, prosecute, convict, and punish problems are not 
adequately addressed by suggesting a certification and a dedicated group of 
prosecutors in DOJ.74 Lawmakers must face the challenge of having to pass on 
prosecuting to the fullest extent of the law some of the largest corporations be-
cause they are simply too big, too important to our global economy, and too 
systemically important to ours. This Act, unfortunately, does not directly or in-
directly offer criminal justice functionaries a genuine solution.75 
Conclusion 
It would be a fair and poignant response to say that progressives’ sense of 
indignation over all things corporate may actually hold some promise for 
achieving unfinished substantive law reforms. The longstanding ambivalence 
with the idea of corporate criminal liability in the United States is traceable, at 
least in part, to the general public’s lack of affect over organizational offend-
ing.76 The expressive aspects of morality—blame, resentment, and anger among 
them—shape our moral relationships with businesses more generally.77 Pro-
gressives are justly fueled by the kind of indignation over corporate wrongdo-
ers that is so very absent and needed today. The challenge is to channel this in-
dignation and take seriously the idea of passing progressive corporate crime 
legislation that is fair, measured, and evidence-based. It is but a small step for 
progressives to distinguish the worst of corporate wrongdoers from all corpora-
tions—to levy indignation towards specific wrongdoers.78 
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